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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

NSS, JCS reviews completed.

Intelligence Memorandum

India's Relations With Bangla Desh

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6 October 1971

Attached to Spoor memo from Hoskinson/Kennedy for HAK, 7 Oct. 1971

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 October 1971

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

India's Relations With Bangla Desh

Introduction

On 17 April at "Mujibnagar"--a frequently moved, semifictional capital--the Bangla Desh government inaugurated a new cabinet and ratified a declaration of independence. Indian Government public relations officers handled the advance publicity, and the Indian Army organized the caravan of newsmen who drove to Mujibnagar--on this occasion a mango grove in East Pakistan about a mile and a half from the Indian border. The chairs and public address system bore the markings of the Indian firm from which they had been rented. The canvas on the dias had Indian army markings. Refreshments arrived in an Indian army truck on which the divisional insignia had been obscured by mud. Indian support for Bangla Desh has since been less visible.

Since late March, New Delhi has provided military supplies, training, political support, advice, fire support, and combat personnel for East Pakistani insurgents. As a result of this extensive support, the Indian Government has been able so far to exercise considerable control over the Bangla Desh movement. This may lessen if the strains now appearing between the Bengalis and New Delhi increase.

MORI PAGES 3-10 PER C05485824

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.

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25X1The Background

1. Fighting broke out in East Pakistan on 25 March when West Pakistani troops moved to re-assert the central government's control. During the first few weeks of fighting West Pakistani troops were confined to Dacca and a few isolated cantonments. The Bengalis believed that they would win independence quickly, and many Indian policy makers apparently agreed.

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2. Presumably hoping to ensure that an independent Bangla Desh would have no reason to doubt India's good intentions, New Delhi moved quickly to help the insurgents. By 28 March [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Indian arms were being distributed to Bengali freedom fighters. This support was approved, if not ordered, by Prime Minister Gandhi. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the decision was made at a cabinet-level meeting almost immediately after Pakistani troops began to move. [REDACTED] Mrs.

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Gandhi on 30 March informed parliamentary leaders that India was supplying arms to the Bengalis.

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On 2 April India's paramilitary Border Security Force was ordered to assure its mutinous East Pakistani counterparts of "full protection and support." When West Pakistani aircraft destroyed Radio Bangla Desh at Chittagong, the Indians gave the Bengalis a new transmitter. A few Indian officers entered East Pakistan in late March and early April, ostensibly to advise the Bengalis, but more likely to obtain accurate information on the situation there.

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3. Initially, the Indians seem to have made no attempt to use the aid they provided as a lever to secure control over the Bengalis. According to one newsman, any Bengalis who asked for arms at the border were given them. The amount of Indian aid was slight, and the originally optimistic Bengalis may not have regarded it as crucial at this juncture.

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The Political Side

4. By the second week in April, however, it was clear that the Bengali freedom fighters, handicapped by lack of organization and equipment, were no match for West Pakistani regulars in direct fire fights. Bengali resistance melted away as the regulars advanced. During this period, the Indians stayed with their policy of limited involvement. As the Bengalis faded, Indian concern grew over the possibility that in a prolonged struggle leftist extremists would gain control of the guerrilla movement. India's response was to begin focusing support on Bengali political moderates. Some consideration was given at this time to direct intervention, but caution prevailed.

5. The leadership of the Awami League, the centrist party that had led the provincial autonomy movement and had swept elections in East Pakistan the previous December, was disorganized. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the only man who could speak for the party and East Pakistan, was a prisoner. Other party leaders were either making their way to India or already in India fighting among themselves. The Indians concluded that the moderates must be stimulated to give political direction to the struggle. The Awami League was the logical choice, since many of its leaders were in India and dependent on New Delhi for political support and, in some cases, for their daily needs. Thus it was that, under Indian direction, Awami League leaders on 12 April formed a government-in-exile, and announced it publicly on 17 April.

6. Indian diplomatic support for the Bangla Desh government has been active but limited. The Indians in public have taken a line very sympathetic to the East Bengalis. They have permitted the insurgents to open high commissions in India. They have even allowed Bengali officials to travel on Indian documents. The Indians sent their foreign minister to argue the Bangla Desh case in chanceries from Moscow to Washington but they have so far

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refused to grant de jure recognition--which Pakistan would probably see as a casus belli. They apparently have tried to force the Bengali politicians to follow a fairly moderate course. They also may have blocked attempts by the Bangla Desh to open contacts with other foreign countries (Israel has frequently been mentioned but this has never been confirmed). In September, despite the reluctance of the Awami League to share power, the Indians--perhaps thinking a broader base was now needed for the independence movement--succeeded in pushing the league into a liberation front with the less extreme elements. 7

7. Radio Bangla Desh is the primary means of communication between the government-in-exile and the people of East Pakistan. Although it is ostensibly run by the Bangla Desh government, it uses the facilities of All India Radio and would find it almost impossible to continue on the air without Indian support. While we cannot be sure that New Delhi controls the content of Radio Bangla Desh's programs, we do note the broadcasts on most occasions conform to Indian policy.

8. Bangla Desh has failed to gain formal recognition from any country or to win greater international support for the guerrillas. Moreover, it is becoming isolated from both the insurgents in the field and the people of East Bengal. These factors, combined with its domination by the Indians, have weakened the politicians' role. Some Awami Leaguers--once concerned only with ending West Pakistani rule--have become increasingly worried about Indian domination of an independent Bangla Desh. To ensure a political future for themselves and some independence from India, Bengali politicians may at a future point decide to forgo Indian support and guidance and to strike out on their own. For the time being, however, most seem content to live on Indian charity and be guided by their powerful sponsor.

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The Military Side

9. When the East Pakistan freedom fighters started to collapse in early April, New Delhi also began to support a prolonged guerrilla war. Plans were made to train Bengali guerrillas in India, and some camps were in operation by the end of the month. Personnel of the Border Security Force entered East Pakistan to advise and fight alongside the insurgents. The supplying of arms was put on a more systematic basis.

10. Although willing to give extensive aid, the Indians refused to grant them freedom to take actions that might plunge India into war with Pakistan. By late May, as guerrilla fighting began in earnest, members of the Mukti Fouj* were complaining of Indian control.

11. When fighting broke out, deserters from the East Pakistan Police, the paramilitary East Pakistan Rifles, and regular East Bengal Regiment formed the nucleus of the freedom fighters. In addition to the arms these 10,000 or more men brought with them, the Bengalis captured weapons from the West Pakistani troops and further supplemented their supplies from privately owned stocks. When resistance collapsed in April, a part of this supply may have been lost. The hard core of the resistance are perhaps still armed with original weapons.

12. The guerrillas must now depend on weapons furnished by New Delhi if they are to increase in size and effectiveness. Ten thousand or more newly trained guerrillas may already have entered East Pakistan, and the total force may reach as high as 50,000. India has already supplied or plans to supply rifles for "tens of thousands" and is also

*The Mukti Fouj (Liberation Army) was the term originally applied to the armed forces of Bangla Desh. The name was later changed to Mukti Bahini (Liberation Forces).

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providing some heavier weapons such as machineguns and light mortars.

13. The Indians have denied requests by the Mukti Bahini for artillery, tanks, and aircraft. The Bengalis claim they could drive out the West Pakistani Army if they had this kind of equipment, but the Indians have said the time is not ripe. They point out, probably accurately, that the Mukti Bahini is not yet ready for such a campaign. The Indians, however, are at least as interested in preventing the Bengalis from launching a major offensive so obviously based in India and supplied by New Delhi that Pakistan might decide to go to war. By controlling the amount of arms it supplies, New Delhi is also able to deny the Mukti Bahini the men it needs for such an offensive. Although those being trained in the camps might follow Mukti Bahini orders to enter East Pakistan even were India to object, they would be unlikely to do so without weapons.

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14. Indian control of ammunition and other expendable supplies also allows New Delhi to prevent an unwanted major offensive. It even gives them control over day-to-day operations of the cross-border raiders.

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[REDACTED] ammunition is issued only for "approved" missions.

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15. Indian fire support contributes to New Delhi's control of the cross-border raiders. The raiders are frequently protected by artillery directed at West Pakistani troops, and the presence of Indian forces along the border helps deter Pakistani hot pursuit. There is no direct evidence that Indians have threatened to deny fire support for unauthorized raids, but the Bengalis are certainly aware of the possibility.

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16. Indian control of units permanently operating inside East Pakistan is tenuous. Some Mukti Bahini units apparently have received little more than general guidance and a minimum of supplies from the Indians. These units, however, are not in a position to draw India into war with Pakistan. Indian advisers help ensure Indian control of the Mukti Bahini.

in one border sector Bengali, Assamese, and Nepali personnel of the Border Security Force are used in about half the Mukti Bahini raids. One such raid against a Pakistani army camp was led by the colonel commanding the local security force battalion. Pakistani propaganda claims that almost all raids are by Indian infiltrators are exaggerated, but the Pakistanis have produced good evidence--including captured personnel--to substantiate some of the charges.

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17. India probably has no control over the guerrilla units--most of them leftist--which recognize neither the authority of the Mukti Bahini nor the Bangla Desh government. These insurgents depend on arms and ammunition they can acquire from the enemy or friendly civilians supplemented by limited supplies from Indian Communists. The most successful such group--the Naxalites who advocate Maoist revolution--apparently receives no outside support. Should India continue to limit the operations of the Mukti Bahini, these groups might eventually become a significant part of the insurgent movement. And, within these leftist circles, the more radical revolutionaries already appear to be outdistancing the much more easily controlled pro-Soviet groups.

Outlook

18. Despite the failure of the Indians to do all the Bengalis want and despite growing strains in the relationship, the Bengalis do not appear likely to make a major effort to assert

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their independence from New Delhi's control at this time. Both the Bangla Desh government-in-exile and the Mukti Bahini are almost totally dependent on India and probably are unwilling to risk any diminution of Indian support.

19. Leftist guerrillas have shown that Bengalis can fight at least a small-scale guerrilla war without Indian support or Indian control, and eventually the Mukti Bahini may have to follow their example or face the possibility that the fighting may be taken over by extremists. The politicians in exile in India are already showing a greater inclination to act without prior Indian approval, and eventually they may break free of Indian controls or lose out to more independent--and probably more leftist--politicians.

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WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING

October 7, 1971

Time and Place: 3:10 p.m. - 3:50 p.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: India and Pakistan

Participants:

Chairman	Henry A. Kissinger	CIA	Richard Helms John Waller
State	U. Alexis Johnson Christopher Van Hollen	NSC Staff:	Col. Richard T. Kennedy Harold Saunders Samuel Hoskinson R/Adm. Robert Welander James Hackett
Defense	David Packard Armistead Selden James H. Noyes		
JCS	Adm. Thomas H. Moorer Capt. Howard N. Kay		

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

--The State Department is to send a telegram to our Ambassadors in New Delhi, Islamabad, Moscow and Tehran, instructing them to initiate immediate approaches to the local governments at the highest level. In New Delhi and Islamabad, they will urge both Indians and Pakistanis, in the strongest terms, to practice restraint in the current situation. The Soviet Union will be asked to appeal to the Indians for restraint, while the Shah of Iran will be requested to make a similar appeal to Yahya Khan.

--It should be made clear to both the Indian and Pakistani governments that aid will be suspended if war breaks out.

--An inter-agency working group is to be established under the direction of Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson to monitor the India-Pakistan situation and to prepare contingency papers as required.

--No approach is to be made or suggested through the United Nations unless the President grants his approval.

STATE DEPARTMENT REVIEWS COMPLETED

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Dr. Kissinger: Dick (Helms) is going to tell us what's going on.

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War seems most likely to come, as it did in 1965, from a series of miscalculations, but we cannot rule out a deliberate decision by one side or the other. Mrs. Gandhi could still decide to invade East Pakistan to end the refugee influx. The total has passed nine million, with 30,000 more arriving every day.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you believe that? Do you think nine million is an accurate figure?

Mr. Helms: Well, it may not be accurate, but even if it's only seven million, it is still a lot of refugees, with still more coming and practically none returning. In any case, by mid-November Mrs. Gandhi will come under increased pressure to take military measures. Parliament reconvenes then and many members will call for action against Pakistan.

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in the next few weeks. Yahya himself has given the British the impression that he is considering such action, but he has assured our DCM he is not. He may be trying to bring Western pressure on India, or he may think an attack would help by bringing international pressure on both sides.

In East Pakistan, the guerrillas have become more active as the rains taper off. The secessionists and the Indians both want a speedy solution, even at the risk of war, to prevent radical leftist elements from taking over the independence movement. We have reports that up to 100,000 Indian-trained guerrillas will be

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infiltrated into East Pakistan over the next two months. This force would try to seize an area in northeast East Pakistan where a provisional government could be established. India would then recognize the Bangla Desh, which would almost certainly send the Pakistanis to war.

Mr. Johnson: We have received a separate report which indicates that some 40,000 guerrillas will be infiltrated into East Pakistan by October 15.

Mr. Helms: We do have trouble with these figures, but when the weather gets dry they will be infiltrated in numbers, and whether it is 40,000 or 100,000 or something in between, there is no question that there will be a lot of them. The Indians believe that snow and bad weather in the north will keep Pakistan from over-running Kashmir and would hinder Chinese aid to the Pakistanis, and that the guerrillas eventually will be successful in East Pakistan. The civil administration in East Pakistan cannot cope with the enormous social, economic and political problems, and in a few areas the guerrillas have set up their own administrative structure. The Pakistani government has made little headway in winning over the people of East Pakistan, and popular support for the insurgents seems to be increasing.

The secret treason trial of Mujibur Rahman has antagonized the East. 25X1
 he has been sentenced to life imprisonment. Yahya can 25X1
uphold the sentence, commute it or let the matter lie. His decision will be an indication of how conciliatory he intends to be toward East Pakistan. Production in the East is well below last March. Most workers have not returned to their jobs and guerrilla sabotage is a problem. Foreign shipping companies have greatly reduced service, and there is some danger of severe food shortages in parts of the East by November.

Dr. Kissinger: We are indeed fortunate that the Indians are such reasonable and pacific people. Tom (Adm. Moorer), how do you assess the military situation?

Adm. Moorer: The most important factor is that the Indians have a four to one ratio in ground forces. With regard to air forces, the outcome depends in large part on who pre-empts.

Dr. Kissinger: I remember a while back the story of the Indian pilot who crashed near Dacca. The Indians are such poor pilots they can't even get off the ground.

Adm. Moorer: You're right, the Indians can't compete with the Pakistani pilots. The air units of both sides will deteriorate rapidly. The restraints on our aid program have already led the Pakistanis to cannibalize some F-86's in order to keep the rest in the air. After six more months of restraints, they would have to do the same with the F-104's. In combat, attrition and a lack of spare parts would wear them down quickly.

Dr. Kissinger: How long would it take? Two or three weeks?

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Adm. Moorer: I was about to say four to six weeks, but it could be less. The naval forces don't amount to much. The Indians would undoubtedly try to blockade East Pakistan and probably could do so. The Pakistani Army would give a good account of itself but would fail on the logistics problem. The Indian Army eventually would gain a superior position because of its numerical advantage. They have large numbers on the ground, but then they may consider it necessary to keep five or six divisions on the Chinese border.

Dr. Kissinger: Am I right in understanding that we have no evidence of a Chinese buildup?

Adm. Moorer: You are right. There is no such evidence. The main factor here is that neither side can fight a war of attrition. They should begin running out of supplies in four to six weeks, and India will prevail because of superior numbers.

Mr. Johnson: This is especially true in East Pakistan, where they will have a numerical advantage of regular forces plus the support of the Mukti Bahini.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, Alex [Johnson], where do we stand politically?

Mr. Johnson: It's a mess, although there is one new element that is encouraging. The Shah (of Iran) had a meeting with Yahya [Khan] and pressed him strongly to reach a political settlement.

Mr. Van Hollen: The Shah urged Yahya to cut his losses, told him frankly that he didn't have a chance in a military showdown and urged him to seek a political settlement.

Mr. Johnson: We have been in touch with the Bangla Desh people and have tried to encourage the development of a dialogue between Bangla Desh and West Pakistan, but they are insisting on complete and unconditional independence immediately.

Dr. Kissinger: You mean that's their starting point.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, their initial position. Mujibur [Rahman] is the key. If Yahya would release Mujibur and make a deal with him...

Dr. Kissinger: I think that's inconceivable! Unless Yahya's personality has changed 100% since I saw him in July.

Mr. Johnson: I agree that it's unlikely, but we have had some indications.

Mr. Van Hollen: Ambassador Farland recently proposed to Yahya that he make a deal with Mujibur and what is interesting is that Yahya did not take

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the usual negative attitude. This may indicate that they [the Pakistanis] are planning to deal with Mujibur, but this is highly speculative, and I think we must assume the contrary until we get more evidence.

Mr. Johnson: With thousands of Bahini being introduced into East Pakistan at the onset of the dry season, Yahya may feel more beleaguered and may become more interested in seeking a settlement. On the other hand, with the end of the monsoon season, Yahya's army will have greater mobility.

Dr. Kissinger: When he was here last week, Gromyko claimed that the Russians are restraining the Indians. Are they doing this? I haven't seen anything on this.

Mr. Helms: All our evidence indicates this is true.

Mr. Johnson: I agree with that.

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Dr. Kissinger: In what way? I have seen no such information. Are you holding out on me? I don't seem to be getting my copies of cables.

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Dr. Kissinger: The Indians have great ability for determining the impossible and then demanding it.

Mr. Johnson: The Soviets were quite firm in telling the Indian representatives who went to Moscow that they [the Soviets] would not support Bangla Desh.

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Dr. Kissinger: So you are the one who has been holding back my cables, and thought all along it was Joe Sisco.

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Mr. Johnson: The Soviets don't want hostilities if they can be avoided.

Dr. Kissinger: When I was in India recently I formed the opinion that if the Indians were prepared to accept slow evolution in Pakistan, we could work effectively with them, and they would eventually get most of what they want. But they keep lumping all these things together; the refugee problem, independence for Bangla Desh, Pakistani forces on their borders. In their convoluted minds they really believe they can give Pakistan a powerful blow from which it won't recover and solve everything at once. If they would cooperate with us we could work with them on 90% of their problems, like releasing Mujibur or attaining some degree of autonomy for Bangla Desh, and these steps would lead eventually to their getting it all.

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Mr. Van Hollen: The Indians don't have complete control over the Mukti Bahini. They couldn't stop them all if they wanted to.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Saunders) Weren't you with me when I talked with the [Indian] Army Chief of Staff? He was so cocky, he thought he could defeat everyone in sight, all at the same time. We can't ask them to shut off the guerrillas. It will get us nowhere.

Mr. Van Hollen: We could ask them to try to curb the guerrillas.

Dr. Kissinger: No, that's a non-starter. We can't ask them to cut off aid to the guerrillas. It's an internal affair.

Mr. Helms: When you fatten up guerrillas they become a different force. They aren't guerrillas any longer.

Dr. Kissinger: Yahya is a slow learner. He is very deliberate, but if you force him to make a decision, his Moslem instinct may assert itself, and perhaps he will start taking rapid action.

Mr. Johnson: You may be right about that.

Dr. Kissinger: When I was in India in 1962, they told me how they were going to squeeze the Pakistanis along the front. They were so clever they got themselves into a war.

Adm. Moorer: If the Indians really want to punish the Pakistanis, they may be ready to go all the way to a break to do it.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's get this completely clear. Do the Indians really understand that we will cut off aid if they go to war?

Mr. Van Hollen: Yes, the Secretary (of State) told them that.

Dr. Kissinger: This is of the utmost importance. The Indians must understand that we mean it. The President has said so. In fact, he tells me every day. Are you sure the Indians got the message?

Mr. Van Hollen: I believe so. I will double check, but the Secretary has been seeing them in New York.

Dr. Kissinger: Please make sure. What about Yahya? Does he understand that we will suspend aid if he starts hostilities?

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Mr. Van Hollen: [Ambassador] Farland told him that in a conversation just recently, but we can ask Farland to tell him again.

Dr. Kissinger: They [the Pakistanis] should have no illusions on this point.

Mr. Helms: We should make another effort to be sure this is clear. If war breaks out, we will all look back and regret not having made that one extra effort.

Mr. Johnson: It is possible that the Pakistanis may strike out against India because of some minor incursion.

Mr. Packard: I agree, we want to hold them back as much as possible.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Van Hollen) When did the Secretary last see the Indians?

Mr. Van Hollen: The Secretary saw them last week, in New York. He saw Singh [Foreign Minister Swaran Singh].

Dr. Kissinger: How did it go?

Mr. Van Hollen: It was the usual circular argument, the Indians complaining about attacks on Bengalis and about the Pakistanis generating refugees.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't believe that the Pakistanis are generating refugees. Do you believe it?

Mr. Van Hollen: Oh, yes, it's still going on. Pakistani army or militia units will round up a group of people in reprisal for a guerrilla attack or act of sabotage and threaten to kill them, so they go across the border.

Mr. Packard: But that's at the local level. Those are small local units acting on their own authority. The government is not sanctioning that sort of thing and the military commanders in West Pakistan are opposed to it.

Mr. Van Hollen: That's right. The government in Islamabad is opposed to the generation of more refugees, but they haven't been able to stop local units from doing it.

Dr. Kissinger: We have some contingency papers here, but they are not as good as we can do. The China paper suggests a public admonition to China to desist from aiding Pakistan. I can assure you that that is the least likely thing the President will want to do. He has too much going on his China policy to jeopardize it in this way. And besides, I'm not sure it's a good idea.

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Mr. Johnson: We can more usefully engage the Soviets in this matter. Do you think it's worthwhile talking with them about possible restraints on the Indians?

Dr. Kissinger: Alex (Johnson), I'm glad you raised that point, because I want to ask you to set up an inter-agency working group to look at this question. We should have someone approach the Russians, perhaps Gromyko, or whoever you think would be best, you know better about these things, and tell them that this situation (in South Asia) is building to a crisis.

Mr. Van Hollen: We can tell them some of the information we have, let them know we are trying to restrain Yahya and ask them to help do the same with the Indians.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly, we have very parallel interests here. (to Mr. Johnson) Can you get some people together quickly and develop some ideas on how this can be accomplished, say within the next 48 hours?

Mr. Johnson: It just so happens that I have a draft telegram on this subject all ready. I was going to raise it with you.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's see the telegram.

Mr. Johnson: I have it right here.

Dr. Kissinger: Johnson let's me go through all this discussion and then pulls out a bloody telegram.

Mr. Johnson: This was prepared just last night.

Dr. Kissinger: Who will it go to?

Mr. Johnson: Everyone involved: New Delhi, Islamabad, Moscow and including Tehran.

Dr. Kissinger: When Alec Home was here the other day he said that he had been of the opinion that the Pakistanis were at fault, but now he thinks the Indians are equally guilty. He said he thought that Swaran Singh was the worst of the lot.

Mr. Johnson: Another thought that has occurred to us is the possibility of exploring what might be done on a multilateral basis, perhaps at New York, by getting the Soviets, French and British all involved, with U Thant or someone like that taking the initiative. Any proposal made through such a group would have to be relatively easily balanced. It would have to deal not only with the forces on the borders but also the problem of the refugees.

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Mr. Packard: This is a good telegram!

Dr. Kissinger: It's a damn good telegram!

Mr. Johnson: The Secretary will be seeing the head of the Pakistani UN delegation soon.

Dr. Kissinger: What's his name?

Mr. Van Hollen: Mahmoud Ali, he's a kept Bengali.

Dr. Kissinger: In outline, the telegram is excellent, When do you think it should go out?

Mr. Van Hollen: As soon as possible.

Dr. Kissinger: Tonight?

Mr. Van Hollen: The sooner we can get it out the better.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) In view of that cable that came in from Pakistan earlier today, it may be better to send the Pakistani part as a separate telegram in reply to the incoming. This looks like an abrupt answer.

Mr. Johnson: We can send a separate reply to Pakistan and take into account receipt of the other cable. Perhaps we can also introduce in our reply the idea of proposing Security Council action.

Dr. Kissinger: I would rather leave that idea out at this time.

Mr. Johnson: We have had indications that the Pakistanis may be willing to work something out through the UN.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't think they were all that eager.

Mr. Johnson: I had a little concern that these indications may have been a case of the Pakistanis laying the groundwork for a pre-emptive strike. It was just a hunch on my part.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think they would do it before I've been to China. I just don't think they would do it.

Mr. Johnson: There is no point in getting started on UN action unless there is prior agreement between the Soviets and ourselves. That must be our first step.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think the Pakistanis will launch a pre-emptive strike, but we should not mention any approach through the UN until the President has considered the question.

Mr. Johnson: We want to avoid unilateral action by the Pakistanis in the Security Council. That only means confrontation and would accomplish nothing.

Mr. Van Hollen: Perhaps the US, British, Soviet and French delegations could make a combined presentation in the UN.

Dr. Kissinger: That could be a good approach, as long as it doesn't become a squeeze play on the Pakistanis.

Mr. Van Hollen: We have to squeeze both sides to get any kind of agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me just emphasize that before we get started on any action through the UN, we must go to the President. So this telegram will go out tonight. (to Mr. Saunders) Will you see that it goes out?

Mr. Van Hollen: We'll get the telegram out, and I'll notify Sisco.

Dr. Kissinger: You want to try to get Sisco to quiet things down? So far, I've only seen him stir things up. So, first, we send this telegram and second, we get word to Yahya.

Mr. Van Hollen: We will send instructions to our Charge in Islamabad to get in touch with Yahya right away.

Dr. Kissinger: And you will do absolutely nothing in New York unless we first go to the President?

Mr. Van Hollen: Right.

Mr. Saunders: Shall we also ask [Ambassador] MacArthur to discuss it with the Shah and appeal to him to raise the issue again with Yahya? A copy of the cable is going to Tehran.

Everyone agreed.